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COMMENTARY 

THE CONNECTICUT LAW REVISION 

COMMISSION REPORT ON 

PREJUDGMENT DISCLOSURE AND 

THE ABOLITION OF BODY 

ATTACHMENT AND BODY EXECUTION 

MICHAEL R. PARIZO* 
In 1980, the Connecticut Law Revision Commission (the Com­
mission), I recommended the enactment of a disclosure in aid of pre­
judgment remedy device and the abolition of two antediluvian 
creditor remedies: Body execution and body attachment.2 These 
proposals became law when the 1981 General Assembly passed, and 
the Governor signed, Public Act 81-410.3 
I. ABOLITION OF BODY EXECUTION 
Body execution permitted judgment creditors, in actions for 
fraud,4 breach of fiduciary duty,S and tort,6 to imprison their judg­
ment debtors until the judgment was paid. The remedy had been 
• Member of the Connecticut Bar; Staff Attorney, Connecticut Law Revision 
Commission; B.A., Connecticut College, 1976; J.D. Temple University School of Law, 
1979. 
1. The Connecticut Law Revision Commission is a legislative agency charged with 
the statutory duty to "[r]ecommend, from time to time, such changes in the law as it 
deems necessary to modify or eliminate antiquated and inequitable rules of law, and to 
bring the law of this state, civil and criminal, into harmony with modem condi­
tions...." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2-87 (1981). 
2. For the full text of the recommendation see CONN. LAW REVISION COMM'N, 
SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CONNECTICUT LAW REVISION COMMISSION TO THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, app. C, at 2-39 (1980) [hereinafter cited as SIXTH ANNUAL 
REPORT]. 
3. 1981 Conn. Pub. Acts. 
4. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-562 (1981). 
5. ld. § 52-355. 
6. Campbell v. Klahr, III Conn. 225, 149 A. 770 (1930) (authorizing body execu­
tion in tort actions). 
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used to punish recalcitrant debtors, thereby compelling them to dis­
close their assets.7 Criminal sanctions, however, are available to 
punish those guilty of fraud and other torts, 8 and disclosure of assets 
can be compelled under the examination of judgment debtor proce­
dure.9 Consequently, the Commission concluded that body execu­
tion no longer was necessaryJO and recommended its abolition. 
II. ABOLITION OF BODY ATTACHMENT 
The Commission also had a number of reasons for recom­
mending the abolition of body attachment. Body attachment could 
be used by plaintiffs, in actions for fraud II and breach of fiduciary 
duty, 12 to imprison their debtors until sufficient assets were produced 
for attachment. 13 The remedy was subject to attack on constitutional 
grounds. Section 52-369, which authorized body execution, was 
challenged in Abbit v. Bernier l4 as a denial of equal protection in 
violation of the fourteenth amendment. Defendant debtor argued 
that section 52-369 was unconstitutional because the issue of his abil­
ity to pay the debt was not heard prior to levy of the execution. IS 
Consequently, a person could be imprisoned solely because of indi­
gency.16 The United States District Court for the District of Con­
necticut ruled, inter alia, that debtors had to be· given notice and an 
opportunity to be heard on their ability to pay a judgment debt prior 
to levy of a body execution. 17 Body attachment was susceptible to 
7. See 33, C.l.S. Executions § 407, at 763 (1942). 
8. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-119 (1981). 
9. Id. § 52-397. 
10. The Commission also argued that the remedy was archaic and rarely used, 
ineffective and costly, subject to abuse, unsound in principle, and constitutionally sus­
pect. See Abbit v. Bernier, 387 F. Supp. 57 (D. Conn. 1974). These issues are discussed 
more extensively in SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, note 2 supra at 7-14. 
II. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-562 (1981). 
12. Id. Section 52-279 authorizes body attachment in actions where body execution 
is authorized. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-355 authorizes body execution in actions for 
breach of fiduciary duty. Consequently, body attachment is authorized for breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
13. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-279 (1981) (body attachment is not authorized in tort 
actions). 
14. 387 F. Supp. 57, 59 (D. Conn. 1974). 
15. Id. at 60. 
16. Id. at 61 (quoting Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971». 
17. Id. at 62; q. Palumbo v. Manson, 35 Conn. Supp. 130,400 A.2d 288 (Super. 
Ct. 1979). In Po/umbo, the court held that CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-369 (1981) was not 
facially unconstitutional as hearings normally are held prior to levy of a body execution. 
Id. It is not without some irony that the court conceded that a meaningful hearing had 
not been held in the case before it and; consequently, conducted one. Id. at 135, 400 
A.2d at 291. 
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the same challenge because notice and a hearing on the issue of indi­
gency were not statutorily required prior to levy of the body 
attachment. 
Body attachment also was ineffective and costly. One commen­
tator found body attachment "practically valueless" as a method of 
collecting debts and argued that the "experience of practicing attor­
neys will bear out the assertion that there are not five instances in a 
hundred in which the order of arrest results in the collection of a 
debt from a party who could not be otherwise compelled to pay."IS 
One reason body attachment was ineffective was its negligible value 
as a punishment device. Indeed, the value of body attachment as 
punishment has been described as "almost farcical."19 Charles Ev­
ans Hughes, before he became Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court, explained that, while the "rascal who has been 
guilty of embezzlement or fraudulent practices may stand in fear of 
the criminal law, ... the law of civil arrest, gives him little anxi­
ety."20 Hughes concluded that body attachment effected "a punish­
ment ... too mild to be a terror to evil doers...."21 Body 
attachment also was ineffective because of the costs involved. The 
creditor had to pay the costs of maintaining an incarcerated debtor.22 
While these costs could be added to the defendant's debt,23 there was 
no guarantee that the creditor would prevail in his action and even 
less assurance that the creditor could compel the debtor to pay a sum 
larger than the one for which he was unwilling to give security in the 
first instance.24 
III. DISCLOSURE IN AID OF PREJUDGMENT REMEDY 
Following its decision that body attachment was not a viable 
method for coercing the disclosure of hidden assets, the Commission 
next considered whether any coercive prejudgment disclosure device 
18. Note, Arrests in Civil Actions, 5 ALBANY L.J. 243, 244 (1872). See also, Ford, 
Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REV. 24, 47-48 (1926); Sterling, Siudy Relaling 10 
Civil Arresl in California, reprinled in CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, RECOMMENDATION 
AND STUDY RELATING TO CIVIL ARREST, 27, 29-30 (July, 1972); Note, Arresl and Impris­
onment in Civil Actions in New York, 26 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 172, 181, n.72 (1951). 
19. Hughes, Arrest and Imprisonment on Civil Process, 28 REP. N.Y. ST. B.A. 151, 
173 (1905). 
20. Id. at 173. 
21. Id. at 174. 
22. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-59 (1981). 
23. Id. § 18-60. 
24. See, e.g., 2 E. STEPHENSON, CONNECTICUT CIVIL PROCEDURE § 217, at 929 (2d 
ed. 1970). 
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should be made available to creditors simply on allegations of debt 
or damages. Simply abolishing body attachment was one alterna­
tive. California took this approach when it abolished body attach­
ment, forbade imprisonment on civil process prior to judgment,25 
and refused to extend other creditor disclosure devices.26 Although 
less court time is spent hearing attachment matters under the Cali­
fornia procedure and a defendant is free of any coercion until a 
judgment has been rendered against him, the plaintiff is unable to 
secure his claim unless he knows the location of the defendant's 
assets.27 
In contrast to California, New York enacted a broad disclosure 
remedy when it abolished body attachment.28 Under New York 
procedure, a plaintiff can file a motion for an order directing a de­
fendant to disclose information regarding property in which he has 
an interest.29 If the defendant refuses to answer a proper question, 
the plaintiff can apply to the court for an order to compel disclo­
sure.30 If the defendant remains contumacious, the court can impose 
sanctions.31 
The Commission recommended that Connecticut adopt a dis­
closure in aid of prejudgment remedy device similar to the New 
York procedure.32 The Commission believed that disclosure was a 
necessary supplement to the remedy of attachment.33 This principle 
already was embodied in Connecticut law authorizing body attach­
ment, body execution, examination ofjudgment debtors, and discov­
ery against garnishees.34 One flaw of body attachment was its 
ineffectiveness. Creditors, by virtue of the prejudgment remedies 
act, were given the right to attach the property of their debtors if they 
25. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 501 (Deering Supp. 1982). 
26. See id. § 491.010 Law Revision Commission comment, (Deering Supp. 1982). 
27. Id. §§ 481.010-493.010 (1982). 
28. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW §§ 6001-7000 (publisher's explanation) (McKinney 
1980). 
29. Id. § 6220. 
30. See id. § 6220 (practice commentary). 
31. Id. § 3126 (McKinney Supp. 1980). These sanctions include "such orders with 
regard to the failure or refusal as are just, among them: ... 3. an order ... rendering 
judgment by default against the disobedient party." Id. 
32. Under New York law, an order of attachment and consequent disclosure are 
available in a limited number of cases including fraud. Id. § 6201 (McKinney 1980). q: 
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-278a to 279 (1981) (permitting attachment in any case in which 
plaintiff can show probable cause for the validity of his claim). Consequently, disclosure 
will be available in a greater number of cases in Connecticut than in New York. 
33. SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, note 2 supra, app. C, at 15. 
34. See notes 2, 4-6, 9, and 11-13 supra and accompanying text. 
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could show probable cause for the validity of their claims.35 The 
exercise of that right, however, was subject to the defendant's ability 
to hide assets and limited by the plaintiff's ability to discover them. 
Attachment is an empty remedy when the creditor is without knowl­
edge of any readily accessible assets. The problem, therefore, was to 
devise a remedy that could be used effectively by creditors and, at 
the same time, would protect debtors from abuse. 
The legislature adopted the following language: 
(a) The court may, on motion of a party, order an appearing 
defendant to disclose property in which he has an interest or debt 
owing to him sufficient to satisfy a prejudgment remedy. The 
existence, location and extent of the defendant's interest in such 
property or debts shall be subject to disclosure. The form and 
terms of the disclosure shall be determined by the court. 
(b) A motion to disclose pursuant to this section may be 
made by attaching it to the application for a prejudgment remedy 
or may be made at any time after the filing of the application. 
(c) The court may order disclosure at any time prior to final 
judgment after it has determined that the party filing the motion 
for disclosure has, pursuant to either section 52-278d, 52-278e or 
52-278i of the general statutes, probable cause sufficient for the 
issuance of a prejudgment remedy. 
(d) A defendant, in lieu of disclosing assets pursuant to sub­
section (a) of this section, may move the court for substitution 
either of a bond with surety substantially in compliance with sec­
tions 52-307 and 52-308 of the general statutes or of other suffi­
cient security. 
(e) Rules ofcourt shall be enacted to carry out the foregoing 
provisions and may provide for reasonable sanctions to enforce 
orders issued pursuant to this section.36 
Use of the procedure is relatively straightforward. The plaintiff 
first must file a motion for disclosure.3? The court hearing the mo­
tion then must find probable cause sufficient for the issuance of a 
prejudgment remedy (PIR) , after which disclosure can be ordered 
against an appearing defendant.38 The motion procedure was writ­
ten to be as convenient as possible for courts and creditors. Subsec­
tion (b) provides that the plaintiff's motion may be "made by 
attaching it to the application for a prejudgment remedy or may be 
35. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-278d, 52-278e & 52-278i (1981). 
36. 1981 Conn. Pub. Acts 81-410. 
37. Id. at 81-41O(b). -, 
38. Id. at BI-41O(c). 
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made at any time after the filing of the application."39 Plaintiffs are 
given the opportunity to make their motion for disclosure at the 
same time that they apply for a PJR because both the order of at­
tachment and the order of disclosure require the same finding of 
probable cause.40 Because a party may file his motion for disclosure 
at the same time he files his application for a PJR,41 the court can 
make a contemporaneous finding of probable cause as to the PJR 
and the motion to disclose. If probable cause is found and disclosure 
is ordered, the defendant either may make the ordered disclosure or 
may move the court for substitution of a bond or other sufficient 
security.42 Defendants who refuse to disclose are subject to court 
ordered sanctions.43 
Unlike body attachment, the new disclosure device is available 
in all cases in which attachment is warranted.44 Because body at­
tachment could be used to punish, it had been limited to cases in 
which the defendant, in some manner, was culpable: Fraud and 
breach of fiduciary duty are examples. Discovery, however, is a col­
lection device only:45 It should be available to creditors regardless of 
the honesty or dishonesty of their debtors. Further, the scope of dis­
covery is broad. The defendant can be required to disclose the exist­
ence, location, and extent of his interest in property, factors crucial 
to any meaningful disclosure. 
The statute also is intended to protect defendants from abuse. 
Discovery is permitted only against appearing defendants;46 thus it 
protects unsophisticated debtors who fail to appear and insolvent 
debtors who plan to default from creditor threats of imprisonment 
for contempt. 
Appearing defendants also are protected from frivolous and 
harassing orders of disclosure. In the first instance, defendants are 
39. fd. at 81-41O(b). 
40. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-278d, 52-278e & 52-278i (1981) set forth the probable 
cause necessary for the issuance of an order of attachment. These sections are incorpo­
rated by reference in subsection (c) of the new section. 1981 Conn. Pub. Acts 81~41O(c). 
41. fd. at 81-41O(b). 
42. fd. 81-41O(d). 
43. /d. 81-41O(e). 
44. The writ of body attachment, at one time, was available in all actions for debt 
and damages. Creditor abuse, however, led to the prohibition of its use in actions 
founded on contract. 
45. It can be argued that the new procedure can be used as a punishment device as 
court ordered sanctions are available against defendants refusing to disclose. The argu­
ment is specious as the punishment is levied, not because of the defendant's inability to 
pay a debt, but because of his refusal to obey an order of the court. 
46. 1981 Conn. Pub. Acts 8l-41O(a). 
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protected because of the costs involved. They also are protected by 
the contingent finding of "probable cause sufficient for the issuance 
of a prejudgment remedy."47 This requirement also ensures that de­
fendants always will be presented with an opportunity to contest 
probable cause. Additional protection from unnecessary requests for 
disclosure is offered defendants by provisions in the new section pro­
viding for judicial discretion. Subsection (a) ensures that even if a 
finding of probable cause is made, the order of disclosure still will be 
within the discretion of the court.48 The form and contents of disclo­
sure also are matters of judicial discretion.49 Finally, the defendant 
can be required to disclose only assets sufficient to satisfy the order 
of attachment.50 
A defendant can avoid disclosure, even after it has been or­
dered, by substituting sufficient security. In ordinary attachment 
cases, the defendant cannot substitute a bond until an attachment 
has been levied.51 As a result, the defendant's interest in his property 
may be disrupted. Under the new procedure, a defendant who has 
been ordered to disclose may substitute a bond or other sufficient 
security prior to the attachment being levied, thereby avoiding a dis­
turbance of his interest.52 This procedure also benefits creditors be­
cause it allows them to become secured earlier. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Public Act 81-410 not only abrogates two archaic remedies from 
Connecticut practice but also closes a gap in the current attachment 
procedure by establishing a disclosure in aid of prejudgment remedy 
device that allows plaintiffs to obtain information regarding attacha­
ble assets from appearing defendants. 
47. .1d. at 81-4IO(c). 
48. Id. at 81-4IO(a). 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id.· 
. 52. 19~1 Conn. Pub. Acts 81-4IO(d). 
